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1. Introduction
In his speech at the opening of the Seventh Session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), 
the so-called Palermo Convention, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) Executive Director Yury Fedotov affirmed that “the fight against organized 
crime cannot be won by any one government, nor by governments alone. Civil 
society and the private sector play an important role, also in raising awareness and 
strengthening resilience to organized crime”.2 He also noted that, in the debate about 
the successors to the Millennium Development Goals, protection against crime and 
violence is a major concern for people everywhere. 
These words confirm that the fight against cross-border economic crime 
has become a top priority issue for the international community and civil society 
worldwide in recent years. For the purpose of our research, with the expression 
cross-border economic crimes or transnational economic crimes we identify offences 
committed across borders, in more than one country, having economic implications. 
Among economic crimes, money laundering emerges as it is the “natural or logic 
consequence”3 of profit generating offences like drug trafficking, terrorist financing, 
fraud, corruption, diamond trafficking. As a matter of fact, the origin of illicit gains 
obtained through criminal activity need to be concealed, “laundered”, in order the 
funds to be used in the legal economy.4 The character of transnationality derives from 
the fact that criminals take advantage of the differences in national legislations in 
order to commit illegal activities and/or to disguise the origins of illegal money. As 
clearly reported by the Secretariat to the Conference of the Parties to the Palermo 
Convention, “while transnational organized crime takes on many forms and presents 
a diverse set of challenges, which can vary greatly between States and regions, 
1 Dr Sara De Vido is assistant professor of international law at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy. While visiting Kobe 
University, she participated as speaker to the seminar “Regulation of cross-border economic crime”, held on 21st October at 
Kobe university. The present contribution derives from her speech. 
2 No room for complacency in global crime fight, says UNODC Chief at crime conference opening, press release, 6 October 
2014, http://www.unodc.org/
3 P. Conte, J. Larguier, Droit pénal des affaires (Paris, Dalloz, 11ed., 2004), p. 238, defining it as a « consequential crime ». 
4 On the evolution of anti-money laundering legislation, see, inter alia, G. Stessens, Money Laundering. A New International 
Law Enforcement Model (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000); P. Reuter, E. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money. 
The Fight against Money Laundering (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2004); W. Gilmore, Dirty Money 
(Strasbourg, CoE edition, 2011); B. Unger, “Money Laundering Regulation: From Al Capone to Al Qaeda” in B. Unger 
and D. Van Der Linde (eds), Research Handbook on Money Laundering (Cheltenham, Elgar, 2012), p. 19, R. Razzante (ed.), 
Il riciclaggio come fenomeno transnazionale: normative a confronto (Milano, Giuffrè, 2014). An economic perspective in D. 
Masciandaro, “Money Laundering: The Economics of Regulation” (1999) 7 European Journal of Law and Economics 225. 
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organized criminal groups and their activities share a number of characteristics. Such 
groups are often flexible, dynamic, innovative and resilient; they adapt and respond 
quickly to law enforcement measures, easily identifying new markets, commodities, 
routes and methods of operation, forming new alliances when necessary and engaging 
in a growing range of illicit activities”.5 Considering the “complex and volatile 
transnational threat”6 caused by criminality, the answer must be international, or, 
as we will try to prove, truly “transnational”. Over the years, the response at the 
international and regional level has been twofold: first, international cooperation by 
means of bilateral or multilateral treaties, and, more recently, by means of networks. 
The purpose of the first part of this article is to explain what we consider for 
“network regulation” in the fight against transnational criminality, and to provide 
some concrete examples of this concept. The notion has been developed in the field 
of financial regulation but we will strive to demonstrate that it perfectly suits the 
struggle against different forms of criminality expanded worldwide. In a second part 
of this contribution, we will outline pros and cons of network regulation in order to 
answer to the question as of whether or not it can be considered as an alternative to 
international treaties in responding to current global threats. 
2. From international treaties to the emergence of networks to 
combat transnational crimes
States have concluded several international treaties in order to establish 
forms of cooperation in the fight against specific forms of transnational crimes. Here 
some examples both at the international and regional level are given as illustration. 
The UN General Assembly adopted the Convention for the suppression of the 
financing of terrorism in 1999, which entered into force only in 2002, after the 2001 
terrorist attacks showed how terrorists need financial support for the purpose of 
carrying out their illegal activities.7 The most comprehensive legal instrument in 
the field is the UN Convention against transnational organized crime, adopted in 
2000 and entered into force in 2003.8 This widely ratified treaty criminalizes the 
participation in an organized criminal group (Article 5), money laundering (Article 6), 
corruption (Article 8), and obstruction of justice (Article 23), and provides the legal 
framework for mutual legal assistance, extradition and law enforcement cooperation. 
Furthermore, it includes provisions on training and technical assistance. Specifically 
5 Ensuring effective implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols thereto, Report of the Secretariat, 4 July 2014, para. 3.
6 Report of the Secretariat, cit., para. 4. See also, for the Asia Pacific Region, A. Schloenhardt, “Fighting Organized Crime 
in the Asia Pacific Region: New Weapons, Lost Wars” (2012) 2 Asian Journal of International Law 138. 
7 States parties: 186 (last update 3 December 2014). Italy ratified the Convention in 2003, Japan in 2002. 
8 The Convention (States Parties 183 as of 3 December 2014) is supplemented by three Protocols: the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition.  Italy ratified the Palermo Convention in 2006. Japan only signed it in 2000.  
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devoted to the fight against corruption is the UN Convention against corruption 
adopted in 2003, entered into force in 2005.9 Interestingly, the UN Convention does 
not define corruption, but it rather criminalizes a range of corrupt behaviours which 
involve both the public and the private sector. Active corruption is criminalized by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention 
on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions, 
dating back to 1997.10 Shifting to the regional level, and limiting our perspective on 
Europe, the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on laundering, search, seizure 
and confiscation of the proceeds from crime and on the financing of terrorism was 
adopted in 2005, replacing the 1990 Convention in the mutual relations among States 
parties to the former.11  Two CoE conventions are expressly aimed at combating 
corruption, dealing with civil law and criminal law aspects respectively. Dating back 
to 1999, they have been ratified by Italy no sooner than 2013.
The examples provided demonstrate that the fight against transnational 
criminality has gained momentum in recent years and that States have agreed 
on certain measures necessary to prevent and suppress transnational crimes. 
Nonetheless, two issues arise. First, conventions need implementation at the 
domestic level. Therefore States are obliged to criminalize the conducts enshrined 
in the treaties, to extradite or adjudicate alleged perpetrators, to provide mutual 
legal assistance and to adopt preventive measures. The provisions related to 
preventive measures are however quite vague. Let us provide an example. Article 7 
of the Palermo Conventions requires States to institute a comprehensive domestic 
regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions 
and, where appropriate, other bodies particularly susceptible to money-laundering, 
within its competence, in order to deter and detect all forms of money-laundering, 
which regime shall emphasize requirements for customer identification, record-
keeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions. The provision at stake is non 
self-executing; it requires, in other words, the national legislator or the competent 
authorities to clearly define the regulatory and supervisory regime for financial 
institutions in accordance with the domestic legal system. It follows that differences 
in implementation among States may occur. 
Secondly, international treaties face one major obstacle in implementation, 
that is the assessment of State compliance with the treaty provisions. The 1999 UN 
Convention does not provide any mechanism to verify States parties compliance, 
whereas the UN Palermo Convention and the UN Convention against corruption 
establish the Conference of the Parties, which constitutes a political body periodically 
meeting in order to ascertain the respect of the convention by States. For the 
sake of completeness, it should be acknowledged that the COP to the Convention 
against corruption established in 2010 the Implementation Review Process,12 which 
9 States parties 173 (as of 3 December 2014). Italy ratified the Convention in 2009, Japan only signed it in 2003. 
10 Italy ratified the convention in 2000, Japan in 1998. 
11 25 Parties, Italy only signed it in 2005. 
12 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/IRG-sessions.html (last accessed on 7 December 2014). 
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also provides technical assistance and has spurred the process of ratification. The 
implementation of the Palermo Convention is ensured by the activity of several 
working groups and was strengthened by a Pilot Review Programme, which evaluated 
in the period 2010-2012 the status of implementation of some provisions of the 
Convention in few volunteer States parties.13 
A question naturally arises as to whether or not international treaties are 
effective tools to combat transnational crimes. The answer is not straightforward. 
The role of international conventions, as we will argue later in this article, should 
not underestimated as they create the legal background to legitimize cooperation 
among States. Nonetheless, treaties have proved to be insufficient in order to create a 
common ground for cooperation. 
In recent years, the international community has faced a new phenomenon, 
which only apparently contradicts the traditional categories of public international law: 
the establishment of new bodies which cannot be defined international organizations, 
but that nonetheless allow cooperation, mainly among domestic authorities (central 
banks or financial intelligence units, for instance). “Network”, a term which is 
almost unknown in legal doctrine, well depicts the situation of bodies which are 
characterized by horizontal rather than vertical relations.14 Nonetheless, this 
concept was not created for the purpose of identifying the mechanisms in the fight 
against transnational criminality, but rather to depict the new financial architecture 
emerging from the global financial crisis, the Financial Stability Board, the Basel 
Committee being a couple of clear examples.15 Bodies that can be defined networks 
are typically not grounded in constitutive treaties, they are composed of regulators 
instead of (only) political élites or heads of States, and they are characterized by 
limited institutionalization with generally small secretariats and flexible mandates. 
These networks are sometimes simply composed of private parties, like banks. 
Network regulation or “transnational regulation” has developed over the years in 
13 Evaluation of the pilot programme to review implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, Report of the Secretariat, 27 August 2012. 
14 In this sense, E. Tourny, “La gouvernance financière internationale face au paradis fiscaux”, in M. Arcari, L. Balmond, 
(eds), Global Governance and the Challenges of Collective Security (Napoli, Ed. Scientifica, 2012), pp. 311-312; M. Zürn, “Global 
Governance as Multi-Level Governance”, in H. Enderlein, S. Wälti, M. Zürn (eds), Handbook on Multi-level Governance 
(Cheltenham, Elgar, 2010), p. 80; R.H. Weber, “Multilayered Governance in International Financial Regulation and 
Supervision” (2010) 13 (3) JIEL 692. 
15 A lot of literature is available on “networks”. See, inter alia, M. Giovanoli, “A New Architecture for the Global Financial 
Market, in M. Giovanoli (ed.), International Monetary Law: Issues for the New Millennium (Oxford, OUP, 2000); A.-M. 
Slaughter, A New World Order (Princenton, Princeton University Press, 2004); P.-H. Verdier, “Transnational Regulatory 
Networks and Their Limits (2009) 34 The Yale Journal of International Law; K. Alexander, “Global Financial Standard 
Setting, the G10 Committees, and International Economic Law (2009) 34 Brooklyn J. Int’l. L.; E.J. Pan, “Challenge of 
International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks (2010) 11 
(1) Chicago Journal of International Law; T. Cottier, R. M. Lastra, “The Quest for International Law in Financial Regulation 
and Monetary Affairs (2010) 13 (3) JIEL; D. Zaring, “International Institutional Performance in Crisis (2010) 10 (2) Chicago 
Journal of International Law; R. Bismuth, La cooperation internationale des autorités de regulation du secteur financier et le 
droit international public (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011); C. Brummer, “How International Financial Law Works (and How It 
Doesn’t) (2011) 99 The Georgetown Law Journal; C. Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); ID, “Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance – and not Trade, in T Cottier, 
J.H. Jackson, R.M. Lastra (eds), International Law in Financial Regulation and Monetary Affairs (Oxford, OUP, 2012); E.F. 
Greene, J.L. Boehm, “The Limits of ‘Name-and-Shame’ in International Financial Regulation (2012) 97 Cornell Law Review; 
D. Zaring, “Finding Legal Principles in Global Financial Regulation (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law. 
86 KOBE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [ No. 48
several sectors, including the environmental one and in the field of harmonization of 
technical requirements.16 Two questions arise: first, why do we need informal means 
of cooperation? Second, why do we need the involvement of the private sector? The 
answer to the former relies on the fact that international treaties are the outcome 
of a long process of negotiation, followed by domestic ratification procedures and 
the consequent entry into force once achieved a certain number of ratifications. 
Accordingly, the recent financial global crisis has spurred States to react in a timely 
way and often to bypass national parliaments in order to ensure an effective answer to 
current threats. The second question is more “practical” in nature. The involvement 
of the private sector does not come as a surprise, indeed. Financial institutions and 
transaction partners or intermediaries (real estate, lawyers, casinos, etc.) encounter 
(potential) money laundering transactions in their daily business.17 
It is not the purpose of this contribution to speculate on the nature of these 
bodies and their legitimacy,18 but to demonstrate that network regulation (well) works 
(despite some legitimate perplexities) in the sector we are focusing on. Therefore, 
some instances will be provided in the following paragraphs. We propose three 
different categories. The first one is composed of standard setting bodies, like 
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), which establish 
common standards to be transposed into domestic law. The second category 
encompasses bodies that realize operational cooperation, in terms of exchange of 
data and information. To this group belong the Egmont Group and Eurojust. The 
third category is formed by private bodies like corporations or financial institutions 
(cooperation private to private). For our purposes, the analysis will be limited to the 
Wolfsberg group. 
2. 1. Example of “networks”: The Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering
The FATF is the most illustrative example of “network” in the fight against 
transnational criminality and it is included in the so-called “international financial 
architecture”.19 By means of its action against transnational criminality, the 
FATF contributes to market integrity and therefore to financial stability. FATF 
was established by the G-7 in 1989 and it is now composed of 34 States and two 
international organizations, namely the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. It is composed of the ministers of the Member States Parties. Since its 
16 T. Hale, D. Held (eds), Handbook of Transnational Governance (Cambridge, Polity, 2011). In environmental law, see J. 
Brunnée, “Enforcement Mechanisms in International Law and International Environmental Law” in V. Beyerlin, P.-T. Stoll, 
R. Wolfrum (eds), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements (Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2006), 1. 
17 B. Unger, F. Van Waarden, “How to Dodge Drowning in Data? Rule – and Risk-based Anti-Money Laundering Policies 
Compared”, in B. Unger and D. Van Der Linde (eds), Research Handbook on Money Laundering (Cheltenham, Elgar, 2012), p. 
399. 
18 See, extensively, S. De Vido, The FSB and the Other New Modes of Governance, in M. Waibel, G. Bastide Burdeau 
(eds), The Legal Implications of Global Financial Crises /  Les implications juridiques des crises financières de caractère 
mondial (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2015 forthcoming). 
19 See, among others, D. Zaring, 2012, op. cit., p. 693; E. Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 185. 
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creation, it has adopted a corpus of recommendations, periodically revised, to fight 
against money laundering, terrorist financing (since 2001) and, more recently, the 
financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The recommendations, 
whose most recent version dates back to 2012, are interpreted in the explanatory 
notes and are considered to be the widely recognized “standards”20 in the fight 
against offences that can undermine the integrity of the global financial market. 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the international community 
has realized how vulnerable the global financial system was to criminal infiltration 
and agreed that States should cooperate in the protection of financial channels 
from terrorist organizations.21 The FATF presents a tripartite structure: Plenary, 
Steering committee and a Secretariat which is based in Paris, at the headquarters 
of the OECD. One of the most interesting features of the body is that it is not an 
international organization, having a flexible structure and mandate, but it works as 
it is. As a matter of fact, the organization has gradually consolidated its structure 
and it is deemed to be the main body in the fight against money laundering at the 
international level. Several FATF-style regional bodies established over the years 
in different regions of the world follow the same guidelines and the same evaluation 
procedures established by the FATF. Of extreme interest is the way through which 
the body assesses compliance with its recommendations. Its experts prepare 
reports after on-site visits and interviews to national authorities. States are ranked 
compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant and non-compliant in relation 
to each recommendation. Furthermore, the FATF periodically updates a list of 
non-cooperative and high risk countries, which prove to be vulnerable to money 
laundering. Although non-binding, recommendations spur cooperation and induce 
States to comply.22
2. 2. Operational Cooperation: The Egmont Group
The Egmont group is described in its official website as “an informal network 
of financial intelligence units (FIU) for the stimulation of international cooperation”.23 
The definition of FIU is taken from the FATF recommendations. A FIU is a “national 
centre for the receipt and analysis of: a) suspicious transaction reports; and b) other 
information relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences and financing 
of terrorism, and for the dissemination of the results of that analysis”. Italy has 
established its own FIU within the Bank of Italy. The Japan Financial Intelligence 
Center was established within the Organized Crime Department, the Criminal 
Investigation Bureau of the National Police Agency in 2007. 
The adjective “informal” highlights the fact that at the basis of cooperation 
20 The word “standard” is used by the FATF for its recommendations. On the notion of standard as «instrument normatif 
des institutions de coopération» (normative instrument used by bodies that allow international cooperation), see v. Bismuth, 
R., La coopération internationale des autorités de régulation du secteur financier et le droit international public (Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, 2011), p. 374.
21 S. De Vido, op. cit. 
22 See further, S. De Vido, op.cit. 
23 http://www.egmontgroup.org/.
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there is not any international treaty, but rather Memoranda of Understanding 
concluded between Financial Intelligence Units. According to the guidelines provided 
by the Egmont Group, “whenever possible, exchanges of information should take 
place without the need for a Memorandum of Understanding, but in some countries 
it is the domestic legislation that requires an act for the purpose of starting 
cooperation”.24 Egmont group falls under the second category we have proposed for 
our research as it allows FIUs to exchange data and information. Nonetheless, it 
should be acknowledged that it also produces principles and guidelines for FIUs.25 
The report named “FIUs in action. 100 cases from the Egmont group” 
describes successful cases of cooperation among units.26 An interesting example 
is the following case, dealing with money laundering through the real estate.27 
The Jamesons, a criminal family, laundered dirty money by purchasing a building 
in Southern Europe. They financed the investment with a bank loan for which two 
life insurance policies were lodged as security. A notary and a European exchange 
office, rather than the individuals involved, had paid the contracts. The insurance 
company (correctly, we must acknowledge) reported the unusual transaction to 
the local FIU, which started investigation discovering that the money had been 
deposited in cash in two other European countries by a person involved in criminal 
activities. Furthermore, investigation allowed the analysts to discover that other 
similar investments had been conducted over recent years. A further interesting 
aspect identified by the analysts was that the family did not have a way of life that 
matched with the amount of known investments in Europe. The members of this 
family seemed to have only small incomes and lived in an inexpensive house that was 
almost entirely financed by a mortgage. Furthermore, according to the local anti-
drugs agencies, the family had links with a criminal known to be involved in drug 
trafficking. The information obtained by the analysts, together with information 
received by other FIUs, led to conclude that the Jamesons were a criminal 
organization operating in Europe. The analysts hence decided to send the case to 
the public prosecutor. The operation under analysis represents a concrete example 
of how cooperation among FIUs should work. Several indicators, “red flags”, like 
the inexplicable complex method of purchasing financial products and large-scale 
cash transactions, constituted the stimulus for further investigation and for a fruitful 
exchange of information among FIUs. 
Notwithstanding many positive cases similar to the one described above, the 
cooperation among FIUs, even among European FIUs, does not always appear devoid 
of difficulties. In particular, differences existing in domestic legislation may represent 
24 Egmont Group, Operational Guidance for FIU Activities and the Exchange of Information, July 2013, p. 4. 
25 The revised Egmont Charter (2013), Egmont Principles for Information Exchange and Operational Guidance for 
FIUs provide the foundation for the future work of the Egmont Group and contribute to greater international cooperation and 
information exchange between FIUs.
26 Egmont Group, FIUs in action. 100 cases from the Egmont Group, 2000. Other recent cases are available at this website. 
http://www.egmontgroup.org/library/cases (last accessed on 3rd December 2014). 
27 The case is reported at p. 17-18. 
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a major obstacle to cooperation. A case recently examined by the European Court 
of Justice can be taken as an example.28 Jyske Bank Gibraltar, a Gibraltar branch of 
a Danish bank, was under the supervision of the Financial Services Commission 
in Gibraltar (home State)29 and operated in Spain (host State) under the rules on 
the freedom to provide services.30 The Servicio Ejecutivo, the Spanish Financial 
Intelligence Unit, asked Jyske to provide documents and information on the identity 
of its customers, since there was a very high risk that the bank was used for money 
laundering operations.31 Jyske only partially answered to the request, invoking 
banking secrecy in Gibraltar, and therefore was fined by Spanish authorities. Was 
Jyske obliged to report to the FIU of the host State? The Spanish Tribunal Supremo, 
before which an appeal against the administrative decision was brought by the 
bank, referred the following preliminary question to the ECJ: “Does Article 22(2) 
of Directive 2005/60/EC32 … permit a Member State to make it a mandatory 
requirement that the information which must be provided by credit institutions 
operating in its territory without a permanent establishment be forwarded directly 
to its own authorities responsible for the prevention of money laundering, or, on the 
other hand, must the request for information be directed to the [FIU] of the Member 
State in whose territory the addressee institution is situated?”  The Court conducted 
the analysis both under the directive no. 2005/60, also known as “third anti-money 
laundering directive” and art. 56 TFEU. It is not the purpose of our research here 
to delve into the case, but it is worth commenting on the conclusions presented 
by the Court in its judgment of 25 April 2013. According to the European judges, 
“the obligation imposed by that legislation on credit institutions carrying out their 
activities under the freedom to provide services may constitute a proportionate 
measure in pursuit of that aim in the absence, at the time of the facts in the main 
proceedings, of any effective mechanism guaranteeing full and complete cooperation 
between financial intelligence units”. In other words, lacking precise forms of 
28 ECJ, case C-212/11, judgment of 25 April 2013. 
29 Apart from the exceptions in the act of accession, Gibraltar is within the EU and subject to EU law. See I. Hendry, S. 
Dickson, British Overseas Territories Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 273. 
30 Article 56 TFEU. 
31 According to a report prepared by the Spanish FIU “in order to develop such an operation in Spain, the institution has 
dual support or backing, namely from the branch in Spain of the parent company and from two firms of lawyers in Marbella 
(Spain). According to information in the public domain, the proprietor of one of the two firms was investigated for money 
laundering offences and his name appears, as does the name of the other firm of lawyers mentioned above, in connection with 
a number of operations divulged to the Servicio Ejecutivo by other persons subject to a duty of disclosure regarding evidence 
of money laundering”. 
32 Directive 2005/60 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, [2005] OJ L309/15. Article 22 reads: “1. Member States shall require the institutions and persons covered by this 
Directive, and where applicable their directors and employees, to cooperate fully:
(a) by promptly informing the FIU, on their own initiative, where the institution or person covered by this Directive 
knows, suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has 
been committed or attempted;
(b) by promptly furnishing the FIU, at its request, with all necessary information, in accordance with the procedures 
established by the applicable legislation.
2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be forwarded to the FIU of the Member State in whose territory the 
institution or person forwarding the information is situated. The person or persons designated in accordance with the 
procedures provided for in Article 34 shall normally forward the information”. 
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cooperation among FIUs,33 more restrictive measures taken by the host State against 
transnational criminality are allowed. 
2. 3. (…) and Eurojust
Eurojust is taken as an example of operational cooperation here in order to 
demonstrate that “networks” can have a solid legal basis in an international treaty. 
As it is well-known, Eurojust was first established by Council Decision 2002/187/
JHA as a judicial coordination unit enshrined in the third “intergovernmental” pillar 
called “justice and home affairs”, before being included in the TFEU by the Lisbon 
Treaty. Article 85 TFEU mentions Eurojust and defines its mission “to support 
and strengthen coordination and cooperation between national investigating  and 
prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime affecting two or more Member 
States […]”. Eurojust is composed of 28 National Members, one from each Member 
State, seconded in accordance with their legal systems. Its competence covers crimes 
such as terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, counterfeiting, 
money laundering, computer crime, crime against property or public goods including 
fraud and corruption, criminal offences affecting the European Community’s financial 
interests, environmental crime and participation in a criminal organisation.34 
Eurojust creates ad hoc coordination meetings, which “bring together both law 
enforcement and judicial authorities from Member States and third States, allowing 
for strategic, informed and targeted operations in cross-border crime cases and 
the resolution of legal and practical difficulties resulting from the differences in 
the 30 existing legal systems in the European Union”.35 Joint investigation teams 
(JIT) constitute a specific instrument in the fight against transnational criminality 
at EU level allowing for cross-border legal assistance through direct exchange of 
information and evidence within a team without the need for traditional channels 
for mutual legal assistance requests.36 According to the 2013 report, Eurojust’s 
assistance in fighting serious cross-border crime registered a 2.8 percent increase, 
from 1,533 cases in 2012 to 1,576 cases in 2013.37 One of the cases reported relates 
to a joint Belgian and Spanish police and judicial operation, supported by Eurojust 
and Europol, which targeted a drug trafficking network that had been active in 
Belgium, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Morocco since 2007. The operation, 
executed between 2012 and 2013, resulted in the neutralization of the group in 2013. 
The criminal organization,  mainly composed of individuals having Moroccan origin, 
laundered 50 million euro from trafficking cannabis. The drug was transferred to 
Spain from Morocco, and then distributed across Europe. The Belgian and Spanish 
desks at Eurojust worked together and facilitated mutual legal assistance. Eurojust 
allowed the parties to overcome an obstacle related to electronic interception that 
33 Some improvements could be achieved once the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive will be adopted. 
34 www.eurojust.europa.eu.
35 Eurojust, Annual Report 2013, The Hague, 2014, p. 23. 
36 Eurojust, Annual Report 2013, cit., p. 27. 
37 Eurojust, Annual Report 2013, cit., p. 9. 
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was caused by differences in the codes of criminal procedure in the two Member 
States. Furthermore, the proceedings were transferred from the Public Prosecutor 
Office in Brussels to a Spanish judge in Torrevieja, thanks to an agreement reached 
within the joint investigation team. The outcome was the arrest of 46 alleged 
members of the organization. 
2. 4. Private-to-private: The Wolfsberg group
The final body we will focus on is the Wolfsberg Group, an informal network of 
eleven banks worldwide, which can be proposed as an expression of self-regulation.38 
The purpose of the group is to develop financial services industry standards, and 
related products, for anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing policies. 
It adopted anti-money laundering principles for correspondent banking in 2014 and 
prepared a questionnaire addressed to banks, a sort of self test which is useful to 
assess the level of customer due diligence applied by financial institutions in their 
daily activities. Customer due diligence consists, as well defined at the international 
level, in the identification of the customer and the assessment of customer’s identity.39 
This form of cooperation “private-to-private”, which may effectively answer 
to the needs of the banking sector, presents a dark side. Let us propose only one 
case which has been widely reported by the press. The Swiss branch of one of the 
global banks belonging to this network has been recently “mise en examen”, which 
means investigated, by French authorities for “illicit financial and banking practices”. 
The bank allegedly helped clients to avoid taxes in 2006 and 2007.40 A similar 
investigation has started in Belgium. Furthermore, in 2012, the bank agreed to pay 
a record of $ 1.92 billion in fines to US authorities for allowing itself to be used to 
launder a river of drug money flowing out of Mexico and other banking lapses.41 The 
US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations prepared a 330-page report 
on the financial institution. In the words of the chairman of the Committee, Sen. Carl 
Levin, D-Mich, “in an age of international terrorism, drug violence in our streets and 
on our borders, and organized crime, stopping illicit money flows that support those 
atrocities is a national security imperative”. The bank, he added, “used its US bank 
as a gateway into the US financial system for some HSBC affiliates around the world 
to provide US dollar services to clients while playing fast and loose with US banking 
rules”.42 The Subcommittee focused on some areas of alleged abuses. In particular, 
“the HSBC’s U.S. bank, HBUS, offered correspondent banking services to HSBC 
Bank Mexico, and treated it as a low risk client, despite its location in a country 
38 Members are: Banco Santander, Bank of Tokyo–Mitsubishi UFJ, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, 
Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, Société Générale, UBS.
39 FATF Recommendation no. 10. 
40 Financial Times, Paris formally investigates HSBC Private Bank, 21 November 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/
fastft/240192/paris-formally-investigates-hsbc-private-bank (last accessed on 7 December 2014). 
41 Reuters, HSBC Holding Plc to pay $ 1.9 billion US fine in money laundering cases, 11 December 2012. http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/12/11/us-hsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211 (last accessed on 7 December 2014).
42 HSBC Exposed U.S. Financial System to Money Laundering, Drug, Terrorist Financing Risks, 16 July 2012, http://www.
hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/hsbc-exposed-us-finacial-system-to-money-laundering-drug-terrorist-
financing-risks (last accessed on 7 December 2014). In (2013) 47 International Lawyer 392. 
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facing money laundering and drug trafficking challenges, high risk clients like casas 
de cambio, high risk products like US dollar accounts in the Cayman Islands, a 
secrecy jurisdiction, and weak AML controls”.
3. Pros and cons of networks
Some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis above. First and foremost, 
the notion of network regulation clearly describes the cooperation existing among 
international – or better “transnational” - bodies against cross-border economic 
crime. The increasing number of “networks” seems to challenge the traditional 
concept of cooperation in international law, based on bilateral and multilateral 
conventions and requiring the involvement of sovereign States. Network  regulation 
is different, as it does not necessarily involve governments or international 
organizations. Nonetheless, States accept the existence of these new forms of 
cooperation. As a matter of fact, not only governments allow regulators to directly 
cooperate, but also accept the sources of law, in terms of standards, of these bodies. 
Standards, recommendations, guidelines are usually transposed into national law, 
indeed. Furthermore, networks are often mentioned by the conference of the parties 
to international conventions in their reports.43 
Secondly, network regulation cannot be considered the solution to all the 
problems. As we tried to explain in the previous pages, networks have proved to 
be efficient in several situations – and the FATF is a perfect example of that – but 
have showed some weaknesses too. The evaluation reports prepared by the FATF, 
for example, have spurred the improvement of national legislations, but a mere 
piece of legislation is not enough to ensure an effective action against criminality.44 
The cooperation among FIUs faces obstacles due to the differences in domestic 
legal systems and would require an intervention at the regional or international 
level. The Wolfsberg group has eventually proved to be the glittering façade of a 
precarious building. Regarding the latter example, however, it should be outlined that 
banks allegedly involved in criminal activities – mainly indirectly, which means by 
facilitating illicit movements of money – have always demonstrated to be cooperative 
with the investigative authorities and/or tried to reach a deal.45 The comparison with 
43 See for example Conference of the parties to the Palermo Convention,  Provision of technical assistance to States in the 
implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, 7 July 2014, 
par. 18: “In order to strengthen interregional cooperation, UNODC promoted cooperation among the centres as well as with 
international and regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Chiefs of Police (ASEANAPOL), 
the Asia-Pacific Information and Coordination Centre for Combating Drug Crimes, the European Police Office, the 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL); the Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre and the World 
Customs Organization. This initiative, known as the “networking the networks” initiative, aims at building and strengthening 
cooperation between participating entities in order to enhance effectiveness in the fight against organized crime”. 
44 This is why the FATF recently started a new round of evaluation focusing on effectiveness of implementation. FATF, 
Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the  FATF Recommendations and the  Effectiveness of AML/CTF Systems, February 
2013. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013%20.pdf (last accessed 
on 7 December 2014).
45 See for example the official declaration of the bank involved in the investigation we have described above. “We confirm 
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States may seem hazardous, but a good solution might be that the Wolfsberg group 
lists “uncooperative institutions” like the FATF lists “uncooperative countries” 
for the purposes of anti-money laundering. Accordingly, banks would be induced 
to cooperate in order to avoid proceedings against them at national level and to 
safeguard their image of sound and secure bank in the international financial market. 
A question remains: is network regulation useful? Or, has network 
regulation proved to be adequate in order to achieve the objective of fighting 
against transnational criminality? Taking into account pros and cons, it should 
be acknowledged that it has well worked, although it has better worked where 
governments (the ministers in the case of FATF) or national authorities (the 
financial intelligence units) are involved. The FATF has increased awareness at 
the international level of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. Its 
standards are used by the large majority of States and the reports have influenced 
national legislations and induced States to comply with (non-binding) standards.46 
The cons are related to the nature of these bodies, which do not generally 
have any legal basis in an international treaty. Networks raise concerns regarding 
accountability and transparency, indeed. Starting from the former, the lack of an 
international treaty – an instrument which is ratified according to the procedure 
established by the national constitution – as a legal basis for the “network” means 
that national parliaments are deprived of their power to “control” to which 
conventions their own State should be part or not. Nonetheless, it might be argued 
that national regulators are domestically accountable. The financial intelligence units, 
for example, are headquartered in a ministry or a national central bank. Turning 
to transparency, especially as far as the decision-making process is concerned, the 
situation has gradually improved. At the beginning of the activity of the FATF, for 
example, decisions were adopted by the plenary meeting with little involvement of 
actors others than States. Nowadays, the FATF develops guidance with input from 
the private sector and experts. Accordingly, these instruments are not merely taken 
at intergovernmental level but consider the position of private parties in order to 
better answer to the necessities of a specific sector. 
4. Networks as alternative to traditional international cooperation?
Will network gradually replace international treaties in defining ways of 
cooperation in the fight of transnational criminality? We are convinced that the 
answer should be negative for a couple of reasons. First, international treaties can 
that HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA has been placed under formal investigation by French magistrates who are examining 
whether the bank acted appropriately between 2006-07 in relation to certain clients of the bank who had French tax reporting 
requirements, as well as in relation to the way the bank offered its services in the country. We will continue to cooperate with 
the French authorities to the fullest extent possible” (reported in Financial Times, Paris formally investigates HSBC Private 
Bank, cit.).
46 On this issue, see C. Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System Soft Law and the Global Financial System, cit.
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offer the legal basis for the establishment of networks. It is the case of Eurojust, 
which was created at the beginning by a purely intergovernmental Council decision 
and then incorporated into the TFEU. We may argue that a legal obligation 
enshrined in a treaty is at the basis of the Egmont group as well, insofar as States 
have international legal obligations stemming from treaties to which they are parties 
related to mutual legal assistance. Therefore, the importance of a “traditional” form 
of cooperation like a treaty should not be underestimated. Secondly, the “threat” 
posed by networks to the sovereign power of States should not be – on the contrary 
- overestimated. As a matter of fact, States authorize their national authorities to 
cooperate according to their legal system and accept the recommendations prepared 
by networks by incorporating them in their national legislation. Networks could not 
work, and even exist, without the will of States.47
Accordingly, there should be a process of cross-fertilization, meaning that 
international treaties may provide the legal framework for more enhanced forms of 
cooperation, which can be better realized with the involvement of national regulators 
and private parties. It does not mean that this situation is the best possible solution 
to combat cross-border economic crimes. Nonetheless the practice has evolved 
emphasizing the role of network regulation. 
Given the above, one should ask whether and to what extent international law 
will be able to answer to current challenges. Criminals are moving fast, exploiting 
all the possibilities given by globalization and modern technologies. Let us consider 
money laundering through art works and virtual currencies like bitcoins. Starting 
from the former, we are not referring here to the theft, forgery or smuggling of 
artworks, which have been known for centuries, but rather to the much more recent 
phenomenon of legal purchase of pieces using ill-gotten money. As the illicit art 
trade ensures high margins of profit, it may be used for laundering proceeds from 
drug trafficking, arms dealing and other illegal activities, indeed.48 This criminal 
phenomenon has been only poorly examined by the international law doctrine 
and by the FATF itself.49 As a matter of fact, among the “designated non-financial 
business and professions”, FATF glossary does not mention art dealers. Criminals 
therefore exploit a gap in the system. In line with FATF recommendations, even the 
EC Directive no. 2005/60 does not include among the addressees of the legislation 
art dealers, although it considers “obliged entities” for the purposes of anti-money 
laundering “other natural or legal persons trading in goods, only to the extent that 
payments are made in cash in an amount of EUR 15 000 or more, whether the 
transaction is executed in a single operation or in several operations which appear 
to be linked”.50 In the new proposal for a fourth anti-money laundering directive, 
which is under discussion before EU institutions, the threshold was fixed by the EU 
47 On this aspect, see S. De Vido, op. cit.
48 D. Nelson,  ‘‘Economic Woes, Art Theft, and Money Laundering: A Perfect Recipe’’ in  N. Charney (ed.), Art and Crime: 
Exploring the Dark Side of the Art World (Santa Barbara, California, Praeger Press, 2009), p. 197.
49 In this sense, F. Martin De Sanctis, Money Laundering Through Art (Heidelberg, Springer, 2013), p. 15. 
50 Art. 2, para. 1, letter e). 
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Commission  at 7500 euro51, without expressly mentioning art dealers.52 Art dealers 
and galleries, where permanently engaged in the business, should have an obligation 
to report suspicious transactions, as provided in some national laws, included the 
Italian one.53 The reduction of the threshold fixed at the EU level to 7500 euro for 
“other” natural or legal persons may reach the majority of the sales from art galleries 
and dealers, but the European legislator could have been more explicit in its new 
legislation. Furthermore, some auction houses, although not obliged to behave that 
way, require under penalty of cancellation, in the contract they propose to the clients, 
evidence that no money laundering or funds for financing of terrorism are involved.54 
In any event, the international framework is good enough to encompass the activities 
of natural or legal persons dealing with artworks.
A major problem is caused by bitcoin, very recent created virtual currency 
which has a “link” to the real world through exchange offices. Bitcoin was launched 
by Satoshi Nakamoto (maybe a nickname) in 2009. According to the definition 
provided by the FATF in a recent report on virtual currencies, Bitcoins are “the 
first decentralised convertible virtual currency, and the first cryptocurrency. 
Bitcoins are units of account composed of unique strings of numbers and letters 
that constitute units of the currency and have value only because individual users 
are willing to pay for them. Bitcoins are digitally traded between users with a high 
degree of anonymity and can be exchanged (purchased or cashed out) into US 
dollars, Euros, and other fiat or virtual currencies”.55 Bitcoins are stored in online 
“wallet”. Transactions (fund flows) are anonymous, but “publicly available in a shared 
transaction register and identified by the Bitcoin address, a string of letters and 
numbers that is not systematically linked to an individual”.56 You can also “mine” 
bitcoins, that is to create them by virtue of a software. Nonetheless, only 21 million 
bitcoins can be created, therefore “as more and more people compete to mine them, 
they require more and more computing power to unlock”57. Bitcoins are vulnerable 
to money laundering, due to anonimity.58 Bitcoin addresses, which are considered the 
“accounts”, have no names or other customer identification. No financial institution 
exercises customer due diligence. The question is the following: should bitcoins be 
regulated? And if so, how? It is not the purpose of our article to provide a specific 
51 The threshold has been finally fixed at 10,000 euro by Parliament and Council negotiators at the end of 2014. Negotiators 
have also agreed on central registers in EU countries listing the ultimate owners of companies.  
52 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing /* COM/2013/045 final - 2013/0025 (COD) *, art. 2, para. 
1, letter e). 
53 Ministerial Decree no. 143, 3 February 2006. See also in Brazil, F. Martin De Sanctis, op. cit., p. 177. The Brazilian 
Council for Financial Activities Control Resolution no. 8 of September 15, 1999. 
54 F. Martin De Sanctis, op. cit., p. 175.
55 FATF, Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential Aml/Cft Risks, 2014, pp. 5-6. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/
fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf (last accessed on 7 December 2014).
56 Ibid.
57 M. Sparkes, How to get your virtual hands on some bitcoins, The Telegraph, 15 January 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/10559175/How-to-get-your-virtual-hands-on-some-bitcoins.html (last accessed on 7 December 2014). 
58 Concerns over the vulnerabilities in the Bitcoins market have been expressed by several actors, including the FATF 
and the European Banking Authority. See EBA opinion on virtual currencies, 4 July 2014, http://www.eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf (last accessed on 7 December 2014). 
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answer to a sector that is still developing and requires thorough examination. 
Nonetheless, in light of what we have argued in the previous pages, we may attempt 
to find an answer. We should first precise that we will not deal with privacy issues 
and the rights of individuals, and that, for the purposes of our research, we assume 
that Bitcoins are a currency, not a good. First, Bitcoins should be regulated as all the 
movements of money are regulated in the world in order to fight against transnational 
criminality. We are convinced that it is not conceivable to have anonymous accounts, 
although virtual, in the global financial market of today. This situation would allow 
unidentified and unregulated subjects to have a competitive advantage compared 
to traditional financial institutions. The problem is how to regulate Bitcoins. 
An international treaty does not seem useful for the purposes of tracing virtual 
transactions. Bitcoins are moving quickly and a treaty would require a long period 
of negotiation. Furthermore, a treaty would not solve all the problems as it would 
probably be the common denominator for cooperation without addressing specific 
issues. Regulation at the domestic level could be more effective, but the exercise 
of jurisdiction may face some challenges. How to reach a virtual account which 
“tumbles” from a server to the other in different parts of the world?59 And here we 
turn to network regulation. In its recent report, the FATF demonstrated to have 
the skills to deal with such new challenge. It could prepare reports or amend its 
recommendation in order to include among the “obliged entities” the “exchangers”, 
defined as “a person or entity engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual 
currency for real currency, funds, or other forms of virtual currency and also precious 
metals, and vice versa, for a fee (commission)”.60 Furthermore, the FATF could 
identify the most vulnerable jurisdictions where servers are most likely to be found. 
Operational cooperation would also be necessary, in order to arrest persons using 
Bitcoins for the purposes of helping criminals to launder their ill-gotten gains. It is 
in such challenging sectors that network regulation comes into play to propose quick 
responses and to address the behaviour (and the legislation) of States and regional 
organizations in the future.
 
59 See the Silk Road and Silk Road 2 cases. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation closed both websites because they 
were favouring the buying and selling of illegal drugs and other unlawful activities. On 7 November 2014, the FBI seized over 
400 Tor website addresses—known as “.onion” addresses—as well as the servers hosting them. US Department of Justice, 
More Than 400 .Onion Addresses, Including Dozens of ‘Dark Market’ Sites, Targeted as Part of Global Enforcement Action 
on Tor Network, http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/more-than-400-.onion-addresses-including-dozens-of-dark-
market-sites-targeted-as-part-of-global-enforcement-action-on-tor-network (last accessed on 7 December 2014). Ulbricht, 
the creator of Silk Road, was arrested in the US and charged with one count of narcotics conspiracy, one count of engaging in 
a continuing criminal enterprise, one of count of conspiracy to commit computer hacking, and one count of money laundering 
conspiracy. US Attorney’s Office, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces the Indictment of Ross Ulbricht,  the Creator and Owner 
of the Silk Road http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2014/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-announces-the-indictment-of-ross-
ulbricht-the-creator-and-owner-of-the-silk-road-website (last accessed on 7 December 2014).
60 FATF, Virtual Currencies, cit., p. 7. 
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